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This article aims at analyzing the link between subsidiaries’ capital structure and taxation in 
Europe. First we introduce a trade-off model, which studies a MNCs’ financial strategy and 
shows how debt policy allows multinational groups to shift profits from low-tax to high-tax 
jurisdictions. By letting the MNC choose both leverage and the percentage of profit shifting, 
we depart from the relevant literature which has mainly focused on the latter. Using the 
AMADEUS dataset we show that: i) subsidiaries’ leverage increases with the statutory tax 
rate, levied in the country where it operates; ii) this positive effect is lower, the higher the 
parent company tax rate is. Furthermore, an increase in the parent company’s tax rate is 
estimated to raise its subsidiaries’ leverage. 
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The literature on multinational companies (MNCs) has gathered interesting
evidence regarding both ￿nancing decisions and their ability to shift income
from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. In particular, this evidence shows that
income can be shifted by means of debt policies, and that the amount of
income shifted depends on tax rate di⁄erentials.
Most empirical work on MNCs￿choices is based on US and Canadian
data.1 More recently, however, scholars have focused on tax determinants
of European companies￿strategy. In particular, Mintz and Weichenrieder
(2005), Buettner et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Buettner and Wamser (2007)
have analyzed the impact of taxation on German companies. Huizinga et al.
(2008) have applied a static model of a multinational ￿rm￿ s optimal pro￿t
shifting policy. Using AMADEUS ￿rm-level dataset for European compa-
nies, they have shown that their theoretical predictions are supported by the
evidence. In particular, a foreign subsidiary￿ s capital structure depends on
local corporate tax rates as well as on the di⁄erence between its parent com-
pany￿ s tax rate and other foreign subsidiaries￿rates. However, the e⁄ect of
taxes on leverage is estimated to be small.
Our article looks at the link between subsidiaries￿capital structure and
taxation in Europe. We ￿rst introduce a dynamic trade-o⁄ model that de-
scribes a MNCs￿￿nancial strategies. In doing so, we can consider default
as a contingent event, which depends on the EBIT￿ s volatility as well as on
other deep parameters (such as the risk-free interest rate, the EBIT￿ s ex-
pected growth). This framework allows us to study the determinants of a
MNC￿ s optimal leverage and to understand how debt policy allows multi-
national groups to shift pro￿ts from low-tax to high-tax jurisdictions. In
particular, we analyze MNC￿ s choices in terms of both optimal leverage and
1For instance, Collins and Shackelford (1992) and Froot and Hines (1995) use consoli-
dated ￿nancial accounting data from Compustat. They show that ￿rms￿￿nancial activities
are a⁄ected by taxation. Altshuler and Mintz (1995) study the impact of the changes to
interest allocation rules in the 1986 tax reform, using the data of large companies. Desai et
al. (2004a) use con￿dential individual data and ￿nd that tax rates strongly a⁄ect the use
of debt by a¢ liates. Their central estimate is that a 10% higher tax rate is associated with
2.8% higher a¢ liate debt as a proportion of assets. Internal debt is particularly sensitive.
Income shifting activities are also been dealt with by Altshuler and Grubert (2003), Desai
et al. (2004), Graham and Tucker (2005), Hines (1999), Jon and Tang (2001), Mills and
Newberry (2004), Newberry and Dhaliwahl (2001), Mintz (2000) and Mintz and Smart
(2004). For further details, see Devereux (2007).
1pro￿t shifting, thereby departing from standard models (see, e.g., Huizinga
et al., 2008), which usually focuses on pro￿t shifting activities assuming that
leverage is exogenously given.
Using the AMADEUS dataset we show that subsidiaries￿leverage in-
creases with its host country tax rate and that this positive e⁄ect is lower
the higher the parent company tax rate is. Moreover, we show that an in-
crease of the parent company￿ s tax rate raises the leverage of its subsidiaries.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the trade-o⁄
model and focuses on the tax determinants of ￿nancial choices. Section 3
deals with the AMADEUS dataset and discusses some preliminary evidence
on our sample. Section 4 provides an empirical investigation of the deter-
minants of these subsidiaries￿￿nancial structure. Section 5 summarizes our
￿ndings.
2 The model
In this section we introduce a trade-o⁄model describing the ￿nancial strate-
gies of a representative MNC resident in country A, and owning a subsidiary
located in country B.2 Here, we assume that a MNC can borrow from a
third-party lender operating in a perfectly competitive sector, which is char-
acterized by a given risk-free interest rate r and by symmetric information.
We will let this MNC both choose its optimal leverage (by setting the coupon
C) and decide how much pro￿t to shift from one country to another.
Let us introduce the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The MNC￿ s EBIT (Earning Before Interest and Taxes), de-
￿ned as ￿(t), follows a geometric Brownian motion
d￿(t)
￿(t)
= ￿dt + ￿dz (t); with ￿(0) ￿ 0; (1)
where ￿ is the expected rate of growth, ￿ is the instantaneous standard devi-
ation of
d￿(t)
￿(t) , and dz (t) is the increment of a Wiener process.
Assumption 2 Within the multinational group, the parent company pro-
duces a portion ￿ 2 (0;1) of the overall EBIT; the remaining part (1 ￿ ￿) is
produced by its foreign subsidiary.
2This model mainly draws on Panteghini (2009).
2Assumption 3 At time 0, the MNC can decide how much to borrow and
consequently pays a constant coupon, de￿ned as C, for debt ￿nance.
Assumption 4 Debt is divided between the parent company and its sub-
sidiary with weights ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿), respectively.
Assumption 5 Debt is non-renegotiable and default occurs when the MNC￿ s
net cash ￿ow falls to zero.
Assumption 6 The cost of default is ￿ 2 (0;1) times the value of the bank-
rupt MNC.
According to assumption 1, a MNC￿ s EBIT evolves stochastically and is
jointly produced by the parent company A and the subsidiary B, with weights
(see assumption 2) ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿), respectively. According to assumption 3,
the MNC chooses its leverage ratio by setting a coupon C.3 For simplicity,
assumption 4 states that debt is divided between the parent company and its
subsidiary with the same weights assumed for the apportionment of EBIT
(i.e., ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿)). It is worth noting that the quality of results does not
change if, for some non-tax-motivated reason, debt weights are di⁄erent from
the EBIT ones.
As explained by Smith and Warner (1979), if debt renegotiation is costly
or even impossible (according to assumption 5),4 default may take place.
Otherwise, the probability of default would be nil. In our model, default
occurs when the MNC￿ s net cash ￿ ow falls to zero.5 In this event, the MNC
is expropriated by the lender, who faces a sunk cost.6 In line with Leland
(1994), such a cost is assumed to be proportional to the MNC value (assump-
tion 6).
Taxation plays a crucial role in our model. Indeed, with zero tax rates
the MNC would have no incentive to borrow. Given these assumptions, debt
3Given C we can calculate the fair value of debt. For further details on this point see
Leland (1994).
4For an analysis of costly debt renegotiation see, e.g., Goldstein et al. (2001).
5This also implies that debt is secured. As explained by Smith and Warner (1979, p.
127) "[s]ecuring debt gives bondholders title to pledged assets until the bonds are paid
in full". As pointed out by Leland (1994), minimum net-worth requirements, implied by
secured debt, are more common in short-term debt ￿nancing.
6For further details on default conditions see Smith and Warner (1979), and Leland
(1994). For a study of corporate taxation under default risk see also Panteghini (2006,
2007).
3￿nance might cause costly default with no bene￿t. However, when taxa-
tion is introduced and interest payments are deductible, a tax bene￿t arises
from debt ￿nance. Let us therefore denote ￿A and ￿B as the parent com-
pany￿ s statutory corporate tax rate in the home country A and the foreign
subsidiary￿ s one in country B, respectively. For simplicity, we also assume
that the tax system is fully symmetric (i.e., pro￿t and loss are treated sym-
metrically) and follows the source principle.7 In this case, the MNC ￿nds it
optimal to borrow by taking account of both the tax bene￿t and the expected
cost of default. According to assumption 4, debt can be divided between the
parent company and its subsidiary.
It is worth noting that, whenever tax rates across countries are di⁄erent,
a MNC has an incentive to shift pro￿t from one entity located in a high-tax-
rate country to another one operating in a low-tax-rate country. We therefore
let the MNC shift pro￿t by means of internal debt ￿nancing. In other words,
the MNC￿ s entities sign a ￿nancial arrangement according to which the entity
operating in a high-tax country borrows from the entity placed in the low-tax
country. This leads to the payment of an interest which reduces (increases)
the reported pro￿t where taxation is high (low). The MNC￿ s overall tax rate
is thus reduced.
However, shifting income by means of intra-￿rm borrowing and lending
is costly. The cost of income shifting is due to two main factors: one is
related to advising activities and the other is due to anti-avoidance rules.
On the one hand, shifting income usually requires the costly advice of tax
and ￿nancial experts. On the other hand, countries aim to prevent tax-
avoiding practices by introducing ad hoc rules, such as thin capitalization
and Controlled-Foreign-Company (CFC) rules.8
Let us therefore assume that the amount of pro￿t shifted is proportional
to the coupon, i.e., ￿C with ￿ 2 [￿1;1]: Denoting ￿ (￿;n) and n 2 [0;1)
as the concealment cost paid by the MNC and the parameter value, which
measures how costly it is for the MNC to shift 1 Euro from one country to the
other, respectively, we can write the overall group￿ s after-tax pro￿t function
7Notice that the existence of deferral possibilities and limited credit rules can de facto
lead to the application of the source principle.




N (￿) = f(1 ￿ ￿A)[￿(￿ ￿ C) ￿ ￿C] ￿ ￿ (￿;n)Cg
parent company￿ s after-tax pro￿t
(2)
+f(1 ￿ ￿B)[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ C) + ￿C]g
subsidiary￿ s after-tax pro￿t
= (1 ￿ b ￿)(￿ ￿ C) + ￿(￿;n)C; (3)
where b ￿ ￿ ￿￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B and ￿(￿;n) ￿ [(￿A ￿ ￿B)￿ ￿ ￿ (￿;n)] are the
MNC￿ s e⁄ective tax rate and the net bene￿t of 1 Euro shifted from a high-
tax to a low-tax country, respectively. As can be seen, (1 ￿ b ￿)(￿ ￿ C) is
the after-tax pro￿t in the absence of pro￿t shifting. If the MNC undertakes
pro￿t shifting activities, the term ￿(￿;n)C is added.
In order to obtain a closed-form solution we introduce the following:






Parameter n allows us to deal with both institutional determinants and
tax and ￿nancial advising activities. On the one hand, the introduction of
thin capitalization and CFC devices, aiming to prevent tax avoiding activ-
ities, raises n and hence, the costs of income shifting. On the other hand,
the decrease in the cost of tax sheltering operations, which is linked to the
degradation of book and tax pro￿ts (see, e.g., Desai, 2003, 2005), leads to a
decrease in n.10
According to assumption 5, default occurs when ￿N (￿) goes to zero.






1 ￿ b ￿
￿
C =
1 ￿ [b ￿ + ￿(￿;n)]
1 ￿ b ￿
C =
1 ￿ ￿ (￿;n;b ￿)
1 ￿ b ￿
C; (4)
9In line with Panteghini and Schjelderup (2006), we also assume that the cost of income
shifting is non-deductible. The quality of results would not change if we assumed partial
or full deductibility of such costs.
10If thus, n goes to zero, the ￿rm can shift pro￿t at no cost: in this case, all the
pro￿t is shifted to the lower-tax country. If, instead, n goes to in￿nity, income shifting is
impossible.
11The quality of results does not change if we set a di⁄erent threshold value. For further
details on default conditions, see, e.g., Brennan and Schwartz (1977), Smith and Warner
(1979), and Leland (1994).
5where ￿ (￿;n;b ￿) ￿ b ￿+￿(￿;n) is the overall tax bene￿t of debt ￿nance. Given
(4) we can now write the MNC￿ s value (see Appendix A) as:
V (C;￿;￿) =


























￿2 < 0. As can be seen,
function (5) consists of three terms. The ￿rst term measures the net present
value of the after-tax EBIT. The second term measures the overall net bene￿t
arising from debt ￿nancing. The third term measures the expected cost of
default. This cost is proportional to the coupon paid. Moreover, it depends





￿￿2 measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on
the event of default.
2.1 The MNC￿ s choices
The MNC can make two tax-motivated decisions. Firstly, it can choose the
group￿ s leverage. Secondly, it can decide how much income can be shifted
from one country to another. Accordingly, in our model the MNC optimally
chooses its overall coupon (C￿) and the percentage of pro￿t shifting (￿￿).
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It is worth noting that our model di⁄ers from those used in previous
articles. For instance, Huizinga et al. (2008) assume an exogenously given
12The maximization of the MNC￿ s overall value (including debt) implicitly rules out any
agency con￿ ict between shareholders and the lender.
6leverage ratio ￿
￿. Deviations of the leverage ratio at any establishment from
the level ￿
￿ are assumed to imply incentive-related costs to the ￿rm. As
shown by solutions (7) and (8), however, both the multinational group￿ s
leverage (i.e., the coupon) and the optimal percentage of pro￿t shifting are
endogenously determined. This means that tax-motivated activities interact
one with the other.
As we can be seen in (7), C￿ is proportional to the current EBIT, ￿.
It is also easy to prove that @C￿
@￿ < 0; i.e., an increase in the sunk cost
of default reduces the propensity to borrow.13 It is worth noting that risk
a⁄ects leverage.14 As shown by Leland (1994), the value of debt is a U-shaped
function of volatility (i.e., it is increasing up to a certain threshold value of
the coupon).
As shown in (8), the optimal percentage of income shifted depends on the
corporate income tax rate di⁄erential (￿A￿￿B). This means that if ￿A > ￿B;
the ￿rm shifts income from the home to the foreign country and vice versa.








This means that a positive tax bene￿t arises whenever tax rates ￿A and ￿B
are di⁄erent.
Let us next provide some comparative statics on tax determinants. As
shown in Appendix C, the derivatives of C￿ with respect to the MNC￿ s e⁄ec-








Given their positive sign, we can say that both the e⁄ective tax rate and
the net bene￿t of pro￿t shifting stimulate borrowing, i.e., raise the optimal
coupon for a given level of EBIT.
13A detailed comparative statics analysis is provided by Leland (1994) and Goldstein et
al. (2001).
14Desai et al. (2004) show that political risk encourages MNCs to use greater debt.
Fan et al. (2003) make a cross-country comparison supporting the idea that business risk
discourages debt issues.





































































According to our model, the e⁄ect of a tax rate change on leverage is twofold.
Firstly, an increase (decrease) in ￿i (with i = A;B) raises (reduces) the
MNC￿ s overall tax rate b ￿. Due to interest deductibility, the tax-rate in-
crease (decrease) raises (reduces) C￿, thereby stimulating (discouraging) debt
￿nance (see the ￿rst term in square brackets on the RHS of derivatives
dC￿=d￿i, with i = A;B). As we have pointed out, this e⁄ect is usually
disregarded in the relevant literature.
Secondly, the tax rate change a⁄ects the tax rate di⁄erential (￿A ￿ ￿B)
and can therefore in￿ uence pro￿t shifting activities (see the second term in
square brackets on the RHS of derivatives dC￿=d￿i, with i = A;B). It is
worth noting that this latter e⁄ect is ambiguous: if (￿A ￿ ￿B) > 0, we have
dC￿=d￿A > 0 and dC￿=d￿B 7 0: If however (￿A ￿ ￿B) < 0, we can see that
dC￿=d￿A 7 0 and dC￿=d￿B > 0: The reasoning behind this ambiguity is
as follows: if (￿A ￿ ￿B) > 0, an increase in ￿A leads to a higher tax rate
di⁄erential and therefore stimulates pro￿t shifting. The opposite is true for
an increase in ￿B. A similar reasoning holds if the tax rate is (￿A ￿ ￿B) < 0:
Given these results, we can therefore say that an increase in the parent
company￿ s tax rate (￿A) can positively a⁄ect a subsidiary￿ s leverage. It is
worth noting that the quality of results would not change if we assumed
N ￿ 1 subsidiaries. Again, we would expect a positive e⁄ect of the overall
tax rate b ￿ and an ambiguous impact of subsidiaries￿tax rates on leverage.
This latter e⁄ect would depend on the signs of tax rate di⁄erentials.
82.2 Bringing the model to the data
In this article, we will use ￿nancial statements￿data to estimate the sign and
size of the tax rate e⁄ects. In line with most empirical research, we will focus
on stocks, rather than ￿ ows. Using our model￿ s notation we will therefore






ES (￿) + DS (￿)
; (11)
as the dependent variable. According to assumption 4, the value of debt is
DS (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)D(￿):
As shown in Appendix D, the value of equity is equal to
































It is worth noting that the impact of taxation on the leverage ratio LS (￿)
usually has the same sign as the impact on coupon C￿. To see this, we
provide a numerical simulation of the optimal coupon and leverage function
(11). To do so, we will assume realistic tax rate values, i.e., 0 ￿ ￿A ￿ 0:5,
0 ￿ ￿B ￿ 0:5. Moreover, in line with line with Dixit and Pindyck (p. 157
and p. 193, 1994; 1999) we set r = 0:04; ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:2. Finally, we set,
￿ = 1, v = 1:1, n = 2, and ￿ = 0:5 (i.e., we assume that the parent company











Figure 1: Optimal coupon for di⁄erent values of ￿A and ￿B:
Figure 1 shows that MNC￿ s optimal coupon is increasing in both the parent
company￿ s tax rate ￿A and the foreign subsidiary one ￿B: It is also easy to
show that C￿ is decreasing in ￿A; only for unrealistic tax rate values (i.e.,
￿A > 0:5).15
Figure 2 shows the e⁄ects of taxation on a subsidiary￿ s leverage (11).
As can be seen, optimal leverage is increasing with both ￿A and ￿B. This
result supports our idea that an increase in the home-country tax rate ￿A can
positively a⁄ect a subsidiary￿ s leverage, despite the (negative) pro￿t shifting
e⁄ect.












Figure 2: Subsidiary￿ s optimal leverage for di⁄erent values of ￿A and ￿B:
It is worth noting that the quality of results does not change if we use
di⁄erent parameter values. In particular, when the weight ￿ is di⁄erent.
Namely, both when the parent company is mostly relevant (￿ > 0:5) and
when the subsidiary is larger (￿ < 0:5), results are similar to those depicted
in Figures 1 and 2.
3 Data and preliminary evidence
The relation between tax schemes and ￿rm capital structure for foreign owned
companies can be studied exploiting both the time variation of the national
tax rates and the cross-national heterogeneity of their home country tax
rates.
A longitudinal data set of companies resident in di⁄erent countries is
provided by the AMADEUS database collected by Bureau van Dijk. This
database provides standardized annual balance sheet and pro￿t & loss items
(consolidated and unconsolidated), for up to 1.6 million companies from 38
11European countries (for up to 14 years), together with information on the
country where ￿rms are located, their legal form and ownership structure.
In order to be included in the database, companies must satisfy at least one
of the following criteria: i) more than 100 employees; ii) operating revenues
of at least 10 million euros; iii) total assets of at least 20 million euros.
Despite the e⁄ort made by Bureau van Dijk to standardize balance sheet
and pro￿ts & loss items of di⁄erent countries, accounting practices are so
heterogeneous that di⁄erences in the interpretation of ￿rms￿￿nancial data
across countries still persist. Furthermore, linking subsidiaries and owners
accounting data may induce a non-random selection problem in the sample
for at least two reasons: (i) we do not have access to accounting data for
non-European companies, and (ii) the coverage of the AMADEUS database
varies across countries and company types. We therefore provide two sets
of estimates, the ￿rst for the complete sample of subsidiaries, and a second
one for the subsample of subsidiaries we are able to link with the accounting
data of their ultimate owners.
We focus on limited companies and limited liability companies,16 resi-
dent in Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden whose ultimate owner is resident abroad in a
known country and it is not an individual or a family. We de￿ne the ultimate
owner as the company which directly or indirectly possesses at least 50% of
the shares of a subsidiary. We decide for a high share of ownership because
a parent company with a lower level of (direct or indirect) ownership may
not be able to a⁄ect debt policy￿choices (Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2005).
Finally, as information on ownership refers to 2005, we keep only those com-
panies whose 2005 accounting data are available for at least 3 consecutive
years. We explored the possibility to use information on the subsidiaries lo-
cated in Germany, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland, but due to the
limited coverage of the AMADEUS database for these countries and the sam-
ple selection criteria adopted, the contribution of these countries in terms of
additional ￿rms was extremely poor (at most 90 ￿rms per country), and
hence, decided to drop them from the sample considered. We have therefore
obtained panel data for 12301 subsidiaries controlled by foreign companies.
16From Amadeus Internet Guide: ￿Limited Companies: companies whose capital is
divided into shares which can be o⁄ered to the general public and whose members are only
liable for its debts to the extent of any amount unpaid on their shares; Limited Liability
Companies: companies whose capital is divided into shares which cannot be o⁄ered to the
general public. The liability of its members is limited to the amount of their shares.￿
12The number of available observations per each ￿rm varies across countries
(see Table 1), going from the average of 2 for Denmark to 6.3 years for France.
The empirical literature on tax-motivated debt ￿nance uses book data
rather than mark-to-market values. We also follow the practice, which is
dictated by the dataset AMADEUS, that contains the ￿nancial reports of
both listed and non-listed companies. Only for the former companies, are
book and mark-to-market values likely to be close, due to the application of
international accounting principles (IAS/IFRS). As to non-listed companies
(that is, a large majority), instead, accounting principles may allow us to
reckon historical rather than fair values. In this case, the book value of one
item may di⁄er from the fair value.
Table 1 shows the 2005 median values of the main balance sheet items
conditional on the residence country. As the population of ￿rms is typically
composed by many small-medium size companies and few large ones, we
prefer to refer to median values to summarize the characteristics of our sample
(in many cases the average of the variable falls well above the 75th percentile).
Table 2 reports some ￿nancial ratios: the leverage, the return on assets
(ROA), the share of ￿xed assets over total assets, and the Z-score.
We calculate the Z-score with the weights proposed in the literature (see
Altman, 2002):
Z ￿ score = 6:56x1 + 3:26x2 + 6:72x3 + 1:05x4;
where x1 is the ratio between working capital and total assets, x2 is the
variation of the "other shareholders funds" over total assets, x3 is the ratio
between EBIT and total assets, and
x4 =
shareholders funds
non current liabilities + current liabilities
:
In line with most research (see, e.g., Altshuler and Grubert, 2003, Desai et
al., 2003, Jog and Tang, 2001, and Mintz, 2000), leverage is given by the
ratio between debt (long- and short-term liabilities, excluded commercial
debt) and total assets.
The striking heterogeneity shown in Tables 1 and 2 highlights the actual
di⁄erences in the companies￿size, together with the variety of accounting
and disclosure obligations and practices. All these factors must be consid-
ered when comparing, for instance, the median value for the total assets of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BE 67.0% 5.7% 19.1% 2.85 9.6% 6.1 1347
DK 62.8% 8.1% 17.3% 3.55 87.2% 2.0 572
ES 63.0% 5.8% 24.6% 4.38 70.9% 5.3 1754
FR 59.7% 5.4% 17.9% 2.91 64.2% 6.3 1172
GB 54.7% 6.1% 14.4% 3.37 3.2% 6.6 3442
IT 74.8% 4.9% 12.5% 3.17 47.2% 4.4 1467
NL 61.8% 7.3% 33.7% 4.59 9.8% 5.3 529
NO 70.0% 9.9% 13.0% 4.59 0.1% 6.1 802
PT 56.9% 5.0% 25.7% 3.90 65.2% 5.8 155
SE 66.8% 5.9% 23.5% 3.30 2.0% 6.0 1061
Total 63.5% 6.1% 17.9% 3.53 29.3% 5.7 12301
Table 2: Median value for leverage, ROA, ￿xed to total assets ratio and Z-
score, percentage of limited companies in 2005, average number of years for
which data are available, and total number of ￿rms in the sample.
of the 3442 British companies (146 mil. Euro), or the median earnings before
interest and taxation (EBIT) of the 529 Dutch ￿rms (4.3 mil. Euro) with
those of the 1172 French subsidiaries considered (only 341 thousand Euro).
Such di⁄erences are somehow reduced when we look at the ￿nancial ratios:
the median leverage ranges between 55% for the British subsidiaries and 75%
of the Italian ones, the ROA goes from a minimum of 4.9% for the Italian
companies to 9.9% of the Norwegian ones. The British subsidiaries account
for 28% of the overall sample, followed by Spanish (14%), Italian (12%), Bel-
gian (11%) and French (10%). When we complement the subsidiaries￿data
with the balance sheets of their ultimate owners we automatically drop all
subsidiaries, whose parent company is located in the US, Japan and other
non-European countries, from the sample. We are able to recover the ac-
counting data of the ultimate owner for about 74% of the 8421 remaining
(European owned) subsidiaries. The nationality mix of the resulting sample
is remarkably di⁄erent from the original one: the share of British subsidiaries
drops to 18%, the Spanish ￿rms account for 16% of the sample, 15% are Bel-
gian and 12% Swedish.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the linked companies: these














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16thiness. The subsidiaries￿median leverage is usually higher than their ulti-
mate owner￿ s one (with the largest di⁄erences in Italy, Norway, Sweden and
France), while the converse is true for Great Britain and Portugal, where
ultimate owners have a higher median leverage (64% vs. 57% of their sub-
sidiaries).
In this article, we will use statutory corporation tax rates. In doing so, we
depart from Huizinga et al. (2008), who use e⁄ective tax rates (accounting
for withholding taxes levied on international transactions) on both cross-
border dividends and interest payments. Of course, their approach would be
necessary if: i) pro￿t was always distributed to the parent company; ii) no
other intra-group transaction would be made (apart from interest payments);
iii) high withholding tax rates were levied. However, we know that 100% of
subsidiary￿ s pro￿t is not necessarily distributed: at least a portion of it can be
retained abroad. Apart from dividends, there are many other kinds of intra-
group transactions (e.g., royalties and commission fees paid by one entity to
another inside the same group). Since we have no information on intra-group
transactions and the withholding tax rates in the countries of our sample are
low (or even zero), we prefer to focus on statutory tax rates.
When we study the relation between taxation and leverage, as well as
its variation across countries and over time, we also need to control for the
business cycle.
Figure 3 shows the statutory tax rate of the subsidiaries (right-hand axis)
together with the growth rate of the per capita gross domestic product based
on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) (source: IMF, left-hand axis). The infor-
mation about statutory tax rates is drawn from KPMG￿ s Corporate Tax Rate
Survey (available at the site www.kpmg.com). In the time interval consid-
ered, the corporate income tax rate remained constant at 28% in Norway and
Sweden, at 35% in Spain, and to 30% since 1999 in Great Britain. The tax
rate changed only once in Belgium (from 40% to 34% in 2003) and Denmark
(from 30% to 28% in 2005) and more frequently in other countries. Belgium,
France, Italy and Portugal are the countries that cut the tax rates the most,
and they mainly did it during periods of slow down of the GDP growth rate.
Figure 3 makes it clear that we cannot rely only on time dimension to iden-
tify the e⁄ect of changes in the subsidiary tax rate on subsidiary￿ s capital
structure.
In Figure 4, we plot the time series of the statutory tax rates of the ulti-
mate owners resident in 15 di⁄erent countries, which is the (almost) complete








































































































































































































































































































































































19Again, substantial time variation of the tax rates is limited to few countries
(e.g., Germany, Ireland, Slovakia and Lithuania), while there is no varia-
tion at all for others (e.g., United States, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden).
As a consequence, there is little time variation of the home (parent) - for-
eign (subsidiary) country tax di⁄erentials (￿A ￿ ￿B). To appreciate which of
these di⁄erentials are mostly relevant for our analysis it is useful to note that
United States, Germany and France are the countries of residence for 47%
of the ultimate owner we consider (see Table 4) and the operating revenues
of their subsidiaries account for about 52% of the cumulated revenues of the
companies in the sample. US companies almost always play a signi￿cant role
as ultimate owners, but still Scandinavian subsidiaries tend to be owned by
other Scandinavian companies, as well as Belgian subsidiaries are likely to be
owned by German, French or Dutch companies. If we analyze the relevance of
the ultimate owners￿countries in terms of cumulated revenues, rather than
in terms of number of companies controlled, the United States and Japan
play a more important role, while that of France and of the Scandinavian
countries is reduced.
In Table 5 we show the average of the foreign-home tax di⁄erential
(￿B ￿ ￿A), that is the average of the di⁄erence between the statutory tax
rate of the subsidiary and that of the parent company. We ￿rst calculate
the simple average of these di⁄erences and then the weighted average, where
each subsidiary￿ s contribution to the mean is proportional to its operating
revenue. For each country the average of the ￿rst available year is not in-
formative because of the few number of observations in the cell. As we can
see, apart from Belgian subsidiaries between 2000 and 2002, parent compa-
nies usually face a statutory tax rate which is higher than the subsidiary￿ s
one. This may suggest that parent companies prefer to locate subsidiaries in
low-tax countries.
4 Regression analysis
In order to study the e⁄ect of taxation leverage decisions, we implement a
multivariate regression analysis. We consider a speci￿cation of the regres-
sion equation, which combines information from past ￿nancial accounts of
the companies (Fit￿1) with business cycle and ￿scal data (Bt and Tit, respec-
tively):
20Subsidiary country of residence
BE DK ES FR GB IT NL NO PT SE Total
BE 0.0% 1.4% 2.6% 8.8% 1.9% 4.8% 5.5% 0.9% 3.2% 1.1% 2.8%
BM 0.7% 0.5% 1.0% 1.6% 2.1% 1.4% 2.6% 1.0% 0.6% 0.8% 1.4%
CH 4.0% 4.2% 4.5% 7.4% 5.4% 7.7% 4.9% 3.4% 3.9% 5.7% 5.4%
DE 10.6% 9.6% 15.6% 10.5% 9.9% 11.8% 11.9% 5.6% 12.3% 7.9% 10.7%
DK 2.1% 0.0% 1.2% 2.4% 1.9% 2.0% 3.0% 10.1% 0.6% 11.8% 3.2%
ES 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 3.2% 1.6% 3.9% 0.8% 0.2% 23.2% 0.3% 1.7%
FI 1.0% 4.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.7% 1.7% 4.5% 1.3% 13.4% 2.4%
FR 23.8% 5.8% 19.2% 0.0% 11.3% 18.5% 9.5% 5.2% 21.9% 10.2% 12.9%
GB 7.3% 7.5% 9.7% 11.6% 0.0% 5.7% 10.0% 6.1% 3.2% 7.2% 5.8%
IE 0.4% 0.2% 1.3% 0.5% 3.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 1.3%
IT 2.1% 1.2% 6.8% 5.5% 2.3% 0.0% 4.3% 0.2% 7.1% 0.8% 2.8%
JP 3.6% 2.6% 4.4% 5.3% 7.5% 2.2% 11.3% 1.2% 2.6% 2.2% 4.8%
LU 3.1% 0.3% 0.9% 0.7% 3.5% 2.2% 0.8% 0.5% 2.6% 1.2% 2.0%
NL 13.1% 5.8% 7.5% 8.2% 5.5% 9.7% 0.0% 5.4% 3.2% 6.4% 7.2%
NO 0.8% 6.1% 0.7% 0.4% 1.0% 0.3% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 10.7% 1.8%
SE 5.7% 28.0% 3.8% 2.4% 3.6% 4.0% 4.0% 41.1% 3.2% 0.0% 7.1%
US 18.6% 21.3% 15.8% 28.2% 32.8% 22.8% 25.0% 13.3% 10.3% 17.3% 23.4%
Percentage of subsidiaries by country of residence of their ultimate owner (rows).
Percentages do not sum up to 100% by column because less relevant countries have been omitted
Subsidiary country of residence
BE DK ES FR GB IT NL NO PT SE Total
AU 0.1% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.0%
BE 0.0% 0.3% 1.7% 4.6% 2.1% 2.8% 1.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 2.0%
BM 0.5% 0.1% 1.5% 0.6% 2.1% 1.5% 1.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.1% 2.0%
CA 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 1.5% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6%
CH 4.1% 2.8% 5.5% 4.8% 7.0% 6.4% 1.4% 2.1% 2.1% 2.5% 6.6%
DE 11.3% 10.0% 14.4% 7.3% 10.4% 16.0% 5.6% 3.9% 19.3% 7.5% 10.4%
DK 4.7% 0.0% 0.7% 0.9% 2.1% 0.5% 1.3% 4.0% 0.4% 4.8% 2.1%
ES 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 1.4% 1.3% 0.5% 0.1% 27.9% 0.2% 1.4%
FI 0.9% 2.6% 0.7% 0.2% 1.3% 0.5% 1.0% 1.7% 1.3% 13.0% 1.4%
FR 20.1% 3.8% 21.3% 0.0% 9.5% 21.2% 8.8% 14.5% 24.2% 4.4% 9.8%
GB 10.7% 10.5% 6.3% 5.4% 0.0% 8.0% 21.2% 15.2% 2.7% 10.7% 1.2%
IE 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2.6%
IT 1.4% 2.1% 4.7% 5.0% 2.7% 0.0% 5.0% 3.8% 3.4% 0.1% 2.8%
JP 6.5% 2.8% 5.1% 6.0% 9.1% 2.5% 16.6% 0.7% 2.0% 4.3% 8.9%
LU 2.6% 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 3.0% 2.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.6% 0.4% 2.8%
NL 10.9% 3.1% 9.3% 10.1% 4.8% 9.0% 0.0% 5.0% 1.6% 8.0% 4.9%
NO 0.3% 9.7% 0.3% 0.2% 1.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 1.1%
SE 2.9% 28.8% 3.0% 0.5% 4.6% 4.9% 1.0% 13.9% 2.9% 0.0% 4.5%
US 21.8% 22.0% 22.3% 46.2% 31.7% 22.2% 32.3% 34.0% 10.4% 37.5% 31.5%
Percentage of cumulated operating revenues by country of residence of the ultimate owner.
Percentages do not sum up to 100% by column because less relevant countries have been omitted
Table 4: Relevance of the home countries by foreign country.
21Subsidiary country of residence
Year BE DK ES FR GB IT NL NO PT SE
1998 -1.2% -8.7% -3.9% 3.8% -2.1% -8.1%
1999 2.2% 2.6% -8.0% -2.5% -4.7% -0.7% -7.4%
2000 2.8% -3.2% 0.4% -7.8% -0.2% -2.5% -4.5% -3.2% -7.0%
2001 4.7% -0.6% 0.7% -6.0% 0.2% -1.1% -3.6% -0.7% -5.5%
2002 5.3% -0.1% -0.2% -5.3% 0.8% -1.5% -3.5% -2.3% -5.3%
2003 -1.0% -5.8% 0.1% 0.3% -5.1% -1.1% -0.9% -3.5% -2.2% -5.2%
2004 -0.8% -3.0% 0.6% 0.6% -4.8% -2.0% -0.2% -3.4% -7.9% -5.0%
2005 0.1% -4.5% 1.2% -0.6% -4.3% -1.2% -2.8% -2.7% -7.4% -3.9%
Average of the foreign - home tax di⁄erential
Subsidiary country of residence
Year BE DK ES FR GB IT NL NO PT SE
1998 -4.9% -9.4% -5.5% 9.6% 7.3% -8.0%
1999 1.7% 1.4% -8.6% -2.7% -7.6% -1.8% -8.4%
2000 2.4% -3.1% -0.7% -8.2% -1.2% -2.5% -7.6% -4.2% -8.1%
2001 4.2% -1.1% -0.9% -6.5% 0.0% -1.3% -6.1% -0.8% -7.4%
2002 4.9% -0.5% -1.7% -5.8% 0.4% -1.8% -5.7% -2.6% -7.2%
2003 -1.4% -10.1% -0.4% -1.4% -5.5% -1.2% -1.6% -6.0% -2.8% -7.2%
2004 -1.2% -2.8% -0.1% -1.1% -5.0% -2.3% -1.1% -6.2% -8.5% -7.0%
2005 -0.4% -4.5% 0.5% -2.4% -4.3% -1.4% -3.5% -5.7% -8.0% -6.1%
Weighted average of the foreign - home tax di⁄erential,
weights given by the operating revenues of the subsidiary
Table 5: Average of the foreign-home tax di⁄erential (tB ￿ tA)
Leverageit = F
0




te ￿ + ￿i + "it; (12)
where i identi￿es the subsidiary ￿rm and t denotes the year of reference.
Following Fan et al. (2003), we include in F 0
it￿1 the past values of the ROA,
the logarithm of the operating revenues, the Z-score index, the ratio between
￿xed assets over total assets and a dummy variable which equals one if at
time t ￿ 1 the subsidiary generated negative operating pro￿ts.17 We control
17We also considered the inclusion of the past value of working capital, but its estimated
e⁄ect on the leverage was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, once controlled for the
variables described above.
22for business cycle e⁄ects by including the PPP per-capita GDP growth rate
in the regression. The ￿scal variables Tit include the subsidiary (￿Bit); its
ultimate owner￿ s statutory corporate tax rate (￿Ait) and their interaction
(￿Bit ￿ ￿Ait).18 Finally, we consider a full set of industry, regional and owner
type dummies.
We rationalize the choice of the ￿nancial account data (Fit￿1) with the
need to control for di⁄erent factors a⁄ecting the access to credit markets and
a ￿rm￿ s demand for loans. We therefore include a measure of ￿rm pro￿tabil-
ity such as ROA (i.e., the ratio EBIT/total assets) because more pro￿table
companies have lower incentives to implement debt policies as they could ￿-
nance their investments through their own resources. Firms reporting losses
have no ￿scal incentives for increasing their debts and they might face credit
constraints. At the same time, they are likely to demand for more loans.
We evaluate which of the two e⁄ects is more relevant by including in Fit￿1
a dummy variable indicating whether companies end up with a loss in the
previous ￿scal year. Since bankruptcy cost may be lower for larger ￿rms
(Warner, 1977; Ang et al., 1982; Pettit and Singer, 1985) we include a mea-
sure of ￿rm size (the logarithm of the operating revenue). We also consider
the ￿xed-to-total assets ratio in order to assess to what extent ￿rms￿assets
structure a⁄ects the level of leverage. Indeed, ￿xed assets are guarantees for
creditors and can positively in￿ uence a ￿rm￿ s leverage (Myers, 1977; Scott,
1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Finally, the Z-score index is included in the
regression in order to take into account the credit worthiness of the company
(Desai et al. 2004; Fan et al. 2003; Panteghini, 2009).
We estimate equation (12) for the full sample and the subsample of the
linked subsidiaries. We provide OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects estimates.19 Fixed
e⁄ects estimates take into account all the (time invariant) unobserved het-
erogeneity which characterizes ￿rms and its likely correlation with the ob-
served characteristics. They are therefore our preferred estimation strategy,
because they provide results which are more robust to the measurement error
problem, to the omitted variables problem and to the sample selection issue
when we restrict our analysis to the subsample of the linked subsidiaries.
In Table 6 we present the estimates of equation (12). Let us consider
the results for the full sample ￿rst. OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects estimates provide
18In order to control for non-linear e⁄ects we also tried to introduce the square of the
two tax rates. However, this variable was never signi￿cant.
19Random e⁄ects estimates do not di⁄er systematically from ￿xed e⁄ects estimates.
23All sample Only linked subsidiaries






























































































Number of ￿rms 12301 6333
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Table 6: OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects estimate. OLS standard errors are clustered
for foreign - home country correlation. OLS estimates include a full set of
industry, country and ultimate owner type dummies.
24di⁄erent pictures of the e⁄ects of past ￿nancial accounts on current level of
leverage. As expected, previous year ￿rms￿pro￿tability, ROAit￿1; negatively
a⁄ect ￿rms￿leverage, though the marginal e⁄ect, estimated with the ￿xed
e⁄ects, is only 1/3 of that estimated with OLS (-0.013 vs. -0.0048). Both OLS
and ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates show that ￿rms with a negative operating pro￿t
in the previous year have a higher leverage. According to OLS estimates, a
higher level of ￿xed assets reduces leverage, while for the ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates
the sign is positive. The ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates of the Z-score parameter
are not statistically di⁄erent from zero, in contrast with the negative e⁄ect
estimated with OLS. Our estimates suggest that one percentage point more
of GDP growth rate increases leverage: this e⁄ect ranges from 0.4 to 0.55
p.p.
The parameters related to the tax rates are more precisely estimated with
the ￿xed e⁄ects approach, rather than with the OLS. Although the single
parameters are not statistically di⁄erent from zero, we reject the hypothesis
that all three of them are jointly equal to zero. Note that, due to the presence
of the interaction term, discussed in theoretical section and described by
derivatives (10), the marginal variation of the expected value of the subsidiary
leverage due to a marginal variation of the subsidiary tax rate is given by:
@E [leverageitjFit￿1;￿Bit;￿Ait;Bt]
@￿Bit
= ￿￿B + ￿￿B￿￿A￿Ait;
where ￿Ait is the ultimate owner tax rate. Similarly, the marginal e⁄ect of
the ultimate owner statutory tax rate is given by:
@E [leverageitjFit￿1;￿Bit;￿Ait;Bt]
@￿Ait
= ￿￿A + ￿￿B￿￿A￿Bit;
where ￿Bit is the subsidiary tax rate. Therefore, the marginal e⁄ect of the
subsidiary (ultimate owner) tax rate is a linear function of the ultimate owner
(subsidiary) tax rate with slope coe¢ cient equal to the parameter of the
interaction term (i.e., ￿￿B￿￿A). It follows that the estimated marginal e⁄ects
are almost always not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero according to the OLS
estimates. The corresponding ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates are depicted in Figure
5: an increase in either the subsidiary or the ultimate owner tax rate always
has a positive e⁄ect on the subsidiary leverage. A change in the subsidiary
tax rate always has a greater impact than a change in the tax rate of the
parent company. The marginal e⁄ect of a tax rate is smaller, the higher the
25level of the other is. At the average level of the ultimate owner tax rate (that
is ￿A = 0:35) the marginal e⁄ect of the subsidiary tax rate is equal to 0.52
(1:03048 ￿ 1:45838 ￿ 0:35 = 0:52). This means that 1 p.p. increase in the
subsidiary tax rate leads to a 0.52 p.p. increase in its leverage. At the average
level of the subsidiary tax rate (that is ￿B = 0:324) the marginal e⁄ect of the
parent company tax rate is equal to 0.253 (0:72553￿1:45838￿0:324 = 0:253),
that is 1 p.p. increase in the ultimate owner tax rate give rise to a 0.25 p.p.
increase in its subsidiary￿ s leverage.
By focusing on the subsample of subsidiaries for which the balance sheet
information of their ultimate owner are available, we are able to take into
account the capital structure of the controlling company. We enrich the
original speci￿cation of equation (12) by adding the leverage of the ultimate
owner at t ￿ 1 as a control variable. As shown in Table 6, controlling for
the leverage of the parent company has proved to be important, but neither
its introduction nor the remarkable di⁄erences between the subsample con-
sidered and the complete set of subsidiaries have had relevant e⁄ects on our
main parameters: the marginal e⁄ects of both the tax rates are similar to
the previously discussed case.
Our empirical results can be compared with Mintz and Weichenrieder
(2005) for subsidiaries of German companies and Huizinga et al. (2008) for
a sample of European subsidiaries. Mintz and Weichenrieder estimated that
at average values a one percentage point subsidiary tax rate increase causes
leverage to rise by 0.41 percentage points. The size of their estimates is
consistent with the corresponding marginal e⁄ect we estimate (see the left
panel in Figure 5). As they used only subsidiaries of German companies,
they were not able to evaluate the e⁄ect of a variation of the home country
tax rate ￿A.
Similarly to our exercise, Huizinga et al. (2008) used a sample of Euro-
pean subsidiaries, but they opted for a di⁄erent speci￿cation. They assumed
that the relative weight of the assets of the subsidiary over the total amount
of assets of the MNC was given and considered the following speci￿cation:
Leverageit = F
0
it￿1e ￿ + ￿￿B￿Bit + ￿￿A
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te ￿ + ￿i + "it;
where ￿i = Ai=(Ap +
P
k Ak), k = 1;:::;n, identi￿es the subsidiaries of the

















































































































































27the parent company may have had subsidiaries in more than one foreign
country and therefore the leverage of subsidiary i could be also a⁄ected by
the tax rate faced by the subsidiary j. On the other hand, they assumed
that the variations in the host country tax rate (￿Ait) and those in the other
subsidiaries tax rates (￿Bjt) had an e⁄ect of the same sign on the leverage of
subsidiary i (the sign of ￿￿A), while the relative size of such e⁄ects was given







< ￿￿B+￿￿A. The e⁄ect of ￿Bj was equal to ￿￿￿A￿j
and that of the parent company tax rate ￿A was ￿￿￿A￿p. Furthermore, they
used an overall tax rate (including cross-border dividend taxation). When
they considered ￿rm-speci￿c risk they obtained b ￿￿B = 0:19 and b ￿￿A = 0:12.
This implies that a one percentage point foreign tax rate increase causes
subsidiary leverage to rise by less than 0:19+0:12 = 0:31 percentage points,
a value still consistent with our results although on the lower bound of our
estimates (see Figure 5). The e⁄ect of the home country tax rate ￿A is
negative and economically negligible if the asset share of the parent company ￿
￿p
￿
is small. However, this result is in sharp contrast with our ￿ndings. As
we have shown, one percentage point increase of parent company tax rate
raises subsidiary￿ s leverage by 0.25 percentage points, when the subsidiary
tax rate equals 35%.
5 Conclusion
In this article we have introduced a theoretical model, describing a MNC￿ s
￿nancial strategies. We have analyzed how debt policy allows multinational
groups to shift pro￿ts from low-tax to high-tax jurisdictions, when leverage
is endogenously determined.
It is worth noting that our model di⁄ers from those used in the relevant
literature. According to these, a MNC￿ s leverage ratio is exogenously given.
In our model, however, both the multinational group￿ s leverage and the op-
timal percentage of pro￿t shifting are endogenously determined. We have
thus shown that tax-motivated activities interact with each other.
This interaction between tax-motivated decisions is a crucial rationale for
understanding our empirical results. Using the AMADEUS dataset we have
shown that when the parent company tax rate is at 40%, a one percentage
point increase in the foreign country tax rate causes a 0.5 percentage points
increase in the subsidiary leverage. At the same time, when the subsidiary
28tax rate is 35% a one percentage point increase in the parent company tax
rate causes a 0.25 percentage points rise in of the subsidiary leverage. This
latter e⁄ect, usually disregarded in the relevant literature, is fully consistent
with our theoretical model and suggests that, when the parent company tax
rate increases, the positive e⁄ect on leverage due to the overall increase in
the tax rate prevails on the pro￿t shifting incentives. In this case, an increase
in the parent company￿ s tax rate can positively a⁄ect a subsidiary￿ s leverage.
29A The derivation of (5)
Let us ￿rst calculate the value of debt, under the assumption that, before
default, the lender is tax exempt.20 When, in the event of default, the lender
becomes shareholder, however, it is subject to the source-based tax levied on
the subsidiary. Using dynamic programming, debt can be written as
D(￿) =
￿
(1 ￿ b ￿)￿dt + e￿rdt￿ [D(￿ + d￿)] a.d.,
Cdt + e￿rdt￿ [D(￿ + d￿)] b.d., (13)
where ￿ [:] is the expectation operator, and a.d. and b.d. mean ￿ after default￿
and ￿ before default￿ , respectively. Expanding the RHS of (13), applying It￿￿ s
Lemma and rearranging gives





where L = (1 ￿ b ￿)￿;C; D￿(￿) ￿
@D(￿)
@￿ and D￿￿(￿) ￿
@2D(￿)
@￿2 : The general
































￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿￿ ￿ r = 0:
To calculate Bi and Di for i = 1;2, we need three boundary conditions.
First of all, we assume that, whenever ￿ goes to zero, the lender￿ s claim is
nil, namely condition D(0) = 0 holds: This implies that B2 = 0: Secondly, we
assume that ￿nancial bubbles do not exist. This means that B1 = D1 = 0:21
Thirdly, we must consider that, at point ￿ = ￿, the pre-default value of debt
20It is well-known that e⁄ective tax rates on capital income are fairly low. For simplicity
we assume that the lender￿ s pre-default tax burden is nil.
21For further details on these boundary conditions see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
30must be equal to the post-default one, net of the default cost. Using the two
branches of (15) we therefore obtain















Solving for D2 gives
D2 =
￿
























Before default, D(￿) consists of two terms. The ￿rst one, C
r , is the present
value of a perpetual rent with the discount rate r. The second term accounts





￿￿2 measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the
event default. After default, the lender becomes shareholder and her credit is
therefore converted into equity. The ￿rm￿ s value is therefore equal to
(1￿b ￿)￿
￿ .





￿N (￿)dt + e￿rdt￿ [E(￿ + d￿)] b.d. (17)
Expanding the RHS of (17), applying It￿￿ s Lemma, eliminating all terms
multiplied by (dt)2 and dividing by dt gives:
rE (￿) = ￿





where E￿ (￿) ￿
@E(￿)
@￿ and E￿￿ (￿) ￿
@2E(￿)
















31Let us next calculate Ai with i = 1;2: In the absence of ￿nancial bubbles,
we have A1 = 0. Moreover, to calculate A2 we let the two branches of (19)



















Solving (20) for A2 gives
A2 = ￿
￿












































Summing (16) and (21) gives the value function (5).
B The MNC￿ s choices
Let us substitute (4) into (5) and rearrange, so as to obtain:
V (C;￿;￿) =
(1 ￿ b ￿)￿
￿
+








b ￿ + ￿(￿;n)
r
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1 ￿ [b ￿ + ￿(￿;n)]
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r
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￿ + [b ￿ + ￿(￿;n)]
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￿ + [b ￿ + ￿(￿;n)]
i



















We can therefore focus on the term
@￿(￿;n)
@￿ : Given assumption 7, we can




Solving (26) we obtain (8).
34C Comparative statics
In this Appendix we show that both @C￿
@￿(￿￿;n) and @C￿
@b ￿ are positive. Taking
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+log(1 ￿ b ￿) ￿ log[1 ￿ [b ￿ + ￿(￿
￿;n)]]:





































1 ￿ [b ￿ + ￿(￿￿;n)]
> 0:
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1 ￿ b ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ [b ￿ + ￿(￿￿;n)]]
















[1 ￿ [b ￿ + ￿(￿￿;n)]](1 ￿ b ￿)
> 0:
35D The subsidiary￿ s value
As shown in (2), the subsidiary￿ s after-tax pro￿t is
￿
N




Using (27) and applying dynamic programming we can calculate the sub-




















As usual, in the absence of ￿nancial bubbles, we have G1 = 0. To ￿nd G2 we
apply the following boundary condition, which states that, at point ￿, the
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